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With population forecasts indicating rapid population growth in developing countries
and slow growth in developed ones, international migration is likely to continue to play
an (increasingly) important role in the global economy. A world of rapid population
growth and increasing pressure on natural resources would greatly bene￿t from South-
North migration if the latter resulted in a reduction in source countries￿fertility rates.
Migration may a⁄ect the fertility of migrants living in the host country, of mi.-
grants￿households back home, and of the home country population as a whole. This
paper focuses on the latter, that is, on the impact of migration on the fertility of
the population in migrants￿country of origin. It presents a theoretical model and
empirically tests the model￿ s predictions. Our main ￿nding is that international
migration results in a transfer of behavioral norms regarding fertility from host to
migrants￿home countries, resulting in a decrease (increase) in home country fertility
rates if they are higher (lower) than host country rates. The literature has so far
not provided any robust evidence of migration externalities through the transfer of
behavioral norms to host countries. An exception is Spilimbergo (2008) who shows
that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy in their home countries, but only
if foreign education is acquired in democratic countries. Here we use a similar con-
ceptual framework and show that it also matters for fertility behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a selected review of the
literature on the impact of migration on fertility rates in the three groups mentioned
above. Section 3 develops a theoretical model where alternative hypotheses regard-
ing the impact of international migration on source country fertility are examined.
Section 4 presents the econometric speci￿cation, describes data sources and reports
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Selected Literature Review
A necessary condition for migration to result in source countries￿adoption of host
countries￿behavioral norms is that they can be adopted by the migrants themselves.
Similarly, one would expect these norms to be adopted by migrant households since
they would most likely obtain the relevant information on host countries￿norms before
the rest of the home country population, and in a more direct and detailed manner.
Examining what the literature says about migration￿ s impact on the fertility of both
migrants and home country migrant households is thus important for understanding
whether and through what channels migration impacts source country fertility. Stud-
ies on the impact on migrants and migrant households are reviewed in Section 2.1,
and on the source country population in Section 2.2.
22.1 Fertility Impact on Migrants and Migrant Households
The bulk of the research has dealt with migration￿ s impact on migrants￿fertility.
Several hypotheses have been examined in this literature, including socialization,
adaptation, and selection.1 According to the socialization hypothesis, migrants are
socialized by early childhood experiences and post-migration fertility levels remain
similar to those in source areas or countries. Early studies on US internal migra-
tion ￿nd support for this hypothesis, with Goldberg (1959, 1960) and Freedman and
Slesinger (1961) showing that rural-urban migrants exhibit higher fertility rates than
urban natives. However, they do not examine changes in migrants￿fertility rates over
time. Moreover, ￿ndings of later studies are generally consistent with the adaptation
rather than the socialization hypothesis.
According to the adaptation hypothesis, the impact of host (home) country values
and norms on migrants￿behavior increases (decreases) with the length of the mi-
gration, with migrants￿fertility rates converging to those of natives over time. This
hypothesis has received wide support in the literature, both for internal (rural-urban)
and international migration.
Internal migration studies that examine the fertility impact of rural-urban migra-
tion have found support for the convergence of migrants￿fertility rates to those of na-
tives. Studies on internal migration in developing countries include Myers and Morris
(1966) on Puerto Rico, Goldstein (1973) on Thailand, Martine (1975) on Colombia,
Park and Park (1976) on Costa Rica, Hiday (1978) on the Philippines, Faber and Lee
(1984) on Korea, Hervitz (1985) on Brazil, Lee and Pol (1993) on Mexico, Brockero⁄
(1995) on thirteen African countries, Umezaki and Ohtsuka (1998) on Papua New
Guinea and Kulu (2003) on Estonia. Convergence results are also obtained in studies
of international migration, including Stephen and Bean (1992) and Lindstrom and
Giorguli Saucedo (2002) for women of Mexican origin living in the US.
Convergence of migrants￿fertility rates might be due to selection rather than
adaptation. Migrants do not constitute a random sample of the home population
and they might exhibit lower fertility rates than the overall population. The studies
described above do not control for potential selection e⁄ects, with some ￿nding that
selection e⁄ects played an important role in explaining the change in fertility associ-
ated with migration, while others did not or found that the presence or absence of
selection e⁄ects depends on the type of migration examined. Studies by Goldstein
(1973), Hervitz (1985) and Kulu (2003) examined the various hypotheses and found
strong support for the adaptation rather than the selection hypothesis, though White
et al.￿ s (1995) found limited support for the latter in a study on internal migrants in
Peru.2
The impact of migration on the fertility of households back home has also been
1A fourth hypothesis is that of disruption whereby migrants show low fertility levels immediately
following migration. However, this hypothesis does not tell us much if anything about migration￿ s
impact on completed (lifetime) fertility, which is the subject of this paper.
2They ￿nd that education and having fewer children are positively related to geographic mobility.
3analyzed, though by a much smaller number of studies. One hypothesis examined
is that the in￿ uence of host countries￿fertility norms persists after migrants return
home and thus results in a decrease in fertility. For instance, Lindstrom and Giorguli
Saucedo (2002) ￿nd that Mexico-US temporary migration of women reduces long-
term household fertility. Another hypothesis is that migration reduces fertility while
the migrant is away and raises it when the migrant returns, a hypothesis con￿rmed in
the case of male migration (e.g., Hervitz 1985). The results have been interpreted as
being due to interruption and catching up of fertility, with no clear long-term fertility
impact.
Lindstrom and Muæoz-Franco (2005) examine the impact of migration on women￿ s
modern contraceptive knowledge and use ￿ and thus on their fertility ￿ in rural
Guatemala. They ￿nd that contraceptive use increases and fertility falls with vari-
ables such as having family members in urban or international destinations, living in
a community where urban migration is common, having social ties to urban or inter-
national migrants, and having an urban migration experience. They also ￿nd that
these variables become non-signi￿cant once they control for their knowledge-di⁄usion
impact, concluding that it is through the knowledge acquired from urban migration
experiences, contacts with urban or international migrants, or living in a community
where such migration is prevalent, that contraceptive knowledge and use increases
and fertility declines.
Thus, most studies on migration￿ s fertility impact have con￿rmed that migration
to low-fertility countries (regions) reduces migrants￿fertility in the home country
(region), and that the reduction in fertility is due to adaptation of migrants￿fertil-
ity behavior to the norms of the host countries (regions). The studies also obtain
similar results with respect to home countries￿migrant household fertility behavior.
Moreover, the latter are associated with a transfer of norms from the host country or
region to the migrant household or community, either because of return migration or
because of information obtained from migrants.
2.2 Fertility Impact on Home Country Population
Another question is whether migration results in a change in fertility rates of the
population in migrants￿countries of origin. Since migrants￿behavioral norms tend
to converge to those of their host countries, it is not unreasonable to assume that
migrants might serve as channels for the transmission of such norms and might a⁄ect
the behavior of natives in their countries of origin, including their fertility behavior.
In such a case, the positive spillover e⁄ect of migration in terms of reduced population
pressure would be vastly greater than if the decline in fertility rates only a⁄ected the
migrants.
It is important to note that the impact of international migration on fertility
rates in migrants￿home country may operate through several channels. The ￿rst
channel consists of migrants￿direct communication with their family, friends and
4community. Second, migration typically triggers an increase in interest by source
countries￿population about the situation in host countries as well as that of their
country￿ s migrants living there. This tends to be re￿ ected, inter alia, in an increase
in media coverage of both the host country and of the migrants living there.
Third, media attention is also likely to focus on the situation of return migrants,
including their economic performance, views and behavioral modes, and how they
might di⁄er from those of natives. Fourth, a number of studies have found that
migration and migrant networks result in increased trade between host and source
countries (Gould 1994, Rauch 2001, Rauch and Trindade 2002) and in increased
investment from the former to the latter (Kugler and Rapoport 2006, Javorcik et
al., 2006). Thus, increased business-related contacts with migrants￿host countries
is likely to constitute another channel through which the latter￿norms are di⁄used
to source countries￿natives. Finally, fertility and other behavioral norms that are
di⁄used through these various channels are likely to be further di⁄used to those who
do not have direct access to them through word-of-mouth.3
The issue of international migration as a channel for the di⁄usion of fertility norms
has not been systematically studied. The only research we are aware of that examines
the link between international migration and source country fertility is Fargues (2007).
His analysis is based on fertility behavior in three source countries, namely Morocco,
Turkey and Egypt. Migration from Morocco and Turkey over the period 1960-2000
was essentially to the low-fertility countries of Western Europe while that of Egypt
was essentially to the high-fertility countries of the Persian Gulf. Fargues shows that
fertility rates in these countries were a⁄ected by the rates prevailing in their migrants￿
host countries, with rates declining in Morocco and Turkey and increasing in Egypt.
He also ￿nds that the degree to which the demographic transition has been attained
increases with migration rates across regions of Morocco and Turkey and decreases
with migration rates across regions of Egypt.
Fargues posits that the impact of host countries￿fertility rates on those in mi-
grants￿home countries is due to the transfer of behavioral norms from host to source
country. However, he does not subject his hypothesis to rigorous testing or consider
alternative ones.4
This paper provides a rigorous econometric analysis of the relationship between
international migration and source country fertility. The impact of the former on
the latter may have a number of causes, one of which is the transfer of host country
fertility norms. These causes are examined theoretically and the hypotheses derived
3Those with direct access to information on fertility norms in host countries or to returning or
visiting migrants may learn about them indirectly through others who do have direct access to such
information.
4Ebanks et al. (1975) for Barbados and Lee and Farber (1985) for Korea compute the impact of
migration on fertility in the home country. However, their calculations are unrelated to the impact
of migration on fertility behavior back home. Rather, they calculate what the fertility in the home
country would have been had migrants stayed home by assuming that migrants￿fertility rates are
equal to those of observably similar non-migrants.
5from the model are tested empirically. The econometric analysis is based on a new
database of international bilateral migration for the year 2000 (Parsons et al. 2007)
that covers all countries and territories. We ￿nd that fertility in migrants￿home
countries decreases (increases) in the case where it is higher (lower) than fertility in
the host countries.
3 Theory
As South-North migration can a⁄ect fertility decisions in the South through multi-
ple channels, assessing the e⁄ect of di⁄usions of norms requires controlling for the
other mechanisms at work. A stylized theoretical model is helpful to derive testable
predictions.
The main mechanisms we envisage here are the following. By a⁄ecting the ex-
pected return to higher education, migration prospects impact on adults￿human
capital investments, which in turn, determine the opportunity cost of raising children.
As a more educated child has a higher probability to emigrate to a rich country, expec-
tations about o⁄spring migration impact on the ￿ quantity-quality￿tradeo⁄. Through
remittances, past migrations impact on adults￿income and a⁄ects the demand for
children. Let us ￿rst describe the general model including all these mechanisms and
then solve di⁄erent variants of the model focusing on each particular channel. Each
variant generates speci￿c testable predictions which should be accounted for in our
empirical analysis.
We consider an overlapping generations economy populated by two-period lived
agents (adult and children). Following De la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004), Galor
and Mountford (2006), Moav (2005) or Mountford and Rapoport (2007), adults￿
utility function has two arguments, the amount of consumption and the total expected
income of children. The second component of the utility function re￿ ects parental
altruism but it could also be compatible with the fact that parents care about old-age
security if children transfer money to their parents when the latter retire. We have
Ut = log(ct) + ￿ log(e wt+1ht+1nt) (1)
where ct denotes parent￿ s consumption, nt is the number of children (fertility), ht+1
is the human capital of each child and e wt+1 is the expected wage per e¢ ciency unit of
labor of children. Uncertainty about future children wages arises from the fact that
children may stay in their origin country or emigrate to a richer country.
Adults are endowed with one unit of time that they can spend in supplying labor,
raising children or investing in their own education. Raising each child requires ￿
units of time. Given their inherited level of human capital ht (resulting from their own
parents￿decisions), adults may spend a fraction Et of their time in higher education
to increase their human capital. The training technology is given by





h ￿ 0. In the next sub-sections, we will consider variants where ￿(:)
has a Cobb-Douglas analytical form and variants disregarding parents human capital
decisions, ￿(Et;ht) = ht.
Parents can also invest in the human capital of their o⁄spring. Investing et dollars
in children￿ s basic education increases their human capital. We assume that
ht+1 = ￿(et) (3)
where ￿
0
e ￿ 0 and ￿
0
e ￿ 0. In the next sub-sections, we will consider variants with
ht+1 = e
￿
t with ￿ 2 [0;1] and variants with exogenous education choices, ht+1 = h.
The adult budget constraint is given by:
ct = (1 ￿ Et ￿ ￿nt)wtHt ￿ ntet + rt (4)
where rt stands for non labor income (including remittances received in adulthood)
and wt denotes adult￿ s wage.
Assuming that adult education arises before employment, adults are uncertain
about their future place of work. If they stay in the South (with probability pt), the
wage rate is given by wt = wh
t . If they move to the North (with probability 1￿pt), the
wage rate becomes wt = w
f
t > wt. The production functions in the South and in the




t are time invariant. Without loss of generality, wh
t can be normalized
to unity and we can write ! = wf ￿ 1.
Adults are also uncertain about the place of work of their children. Children will
become adult at time t+1 and will be able to emigrate with a probability pt+1. The
expected wage for each child in (1) is given by
e wt+1 = pt+1w
f + (1 ￿ pt+1)w
h = 1 + pt+1!: (5)
The migration probability depends on country characteristics (such as geograph-
ical position, colonial links, linguistic proximity, etc.) and individual characteristics.
In particular, it can be reasonably assumed that the probability increases in human
capital. We have:
pt = p0:￿(Ht) (6)
where p0 captures country characteristics and ￿(Ht); such that ￿
0 ￿ 0 and ￿
00 ￿ 0,
re￿ ects the fact that educated agents have a higher probability to emigrate.
Let us now solve particular variants of this general model, based on particular
analytical speci￿cations for our technological functions ￿(:), ￿(:) and ￿(:):
3.1 Fertility, migration and adults￿higher education
We ￿rst focus on the relationship between migration prospects and human capital
formation, as stated in the new brain drain literature (Mountford, 1997, Beine et
7al., 2001 and 2008, or Docquier et al., 2008). To, address this issue, let us consider
a simpli￿ed model in which children￿ s human capital h is exogenous. Think about
a mandatory education system totally subsidized by the government. The cost of
education can therefore be removed from the budget constraint (et = 0). We also
disregard remittances (rt = 0).
Parents can invest Et in higher education to increase their productivity and their
own probability to emigrate. After education, they will work abroad and earn a wage
wf with a probability pt. They will work at home and earn a wage equal to one with
a probability 1 ￿ pt.
The timing is the following. First, parents decide whether or not to invest. Second,
they emigrate or stay in their home country. Third, they work, have children and
consume. Parents thus take tow decisions, Et and nt. The choice of Et is made under
uncertainty about the place of work.
Parents care about the expected income of their o⁄spring. For mathematical
tractability, we assume that the probability that a child will live abroad do not de-
pend on parents￿location. This implies that e wt+1 is given in (1). Considering that
children born abroad have a much higher probability to stay would induce parents to
invest more in human capital. This would simply reinforce our mechanism. As ht+1
is also exogenous, the second component of the utility function (1) only depends on
the number of children, nt.
The following speci￿cations are used:
￿ Parents￿probability to emigrate in (6) has a logarithmic form: ￿(:) = log(Ht).





￿ Children￿ s human capital in (3) is ￿xed: ￿(:) = h.
￿ remittances are nil: rt = 0.
In Appendix 7.1, we solve the model in two steps and proceed backwards. First,
for a given location, parents choose their optimal number of children. Second, after
substituting this number in the utility function, parents decide how much to invest in
education taking into account the endogenous probability to emigrate. The optimal







Agents then maximize the expected utility function, given the endogenous prob-






1 + p0 log(wf)
￿
1 + ￿ + ￿
h




5We could easily extend the model to account for the fact that fertility is lower in rich countries.
8To summarizer, parents￿investments in higher education increase with the prob-
ability to emigrate (@E￿
t=@p0 > 0). Hence, given (7), openness induces human capital
and reduces fertility at origin since @n￿
t=@E￿
t < 0. The mechanism is simple. As
argued in the new brain drain literature, migration prospects to richer countries
stimulates human capital formation. This reduces the maximal amount of time that
parents can devote to children education and labor. In empirical regressions, this ￿rst
e⁄ect of migration on fertility can be easily accounted for by controlling for parents￿
human capital.
3.2 Fertility, migration and children￿ s education
Let us now focus on the links between children￿ s human capital and their probabil-
ity to emigrate. In the second variant, we assume that parents have no possibility
to invest in human capital: equation (2) is such that Et = 0 and Ht = ht is pre-
determined. They do not receive remittances. For simplicity, we assume that the
probability that a child will emigrate is linearly increasing in human capital. The
following speci￿cations are used:
￿ Parents￿probability to emigrate in (6) has a linear form: ￿(:) = Ht.
￿ Parents￿productivity in (2) is predetermined: ￿(:) = ht.
￿ Children￿ s human capital in (3) is endogenous: ￿(:) = e
￿
t.
￿ Remittances are nil: rt = 0.
The optimization problem for remaining adults can thus be written as following:
fnt;etg = argmaxflog[(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet] + ￿ log[nte
￿
t (1 + !p0e
￿
t)]g
As shown in Appendix 7.2, an explicit analytical solution to this problem can be
obtained for ￿ = 1
2:6 The optimal fertility rate and investment in children education
















First, for a given parental income, we have a negative relationship between fertility
and investment in children￿ s education. Clearly, in the absence of migration (p0 = 0),
we have e￿
t = ￿Ht and n￿
t =
￿
(1+￿)2￿. The fertility rate is independent on parental
6Numerical experiments reveal that similar qualitative results would be obtained with ￿ 6= 1
2.
9income. With migration prospects, the optimal investment in education increases
in p0. Hence, for a given wage rate, fertility decreases with migration. This result
contracts with Chen (2006) who shows that when the probability to emigrate is
exogenous, it does not a⁄ect the optimal education of children and fertility. In our
framework with endogenous probability of migration, it comes out that p0 > 0 implies
the optimal fertility rate decreases with parental income. In empirical regressions, this
second e⁄ect of migration on fertility can be accounted in two ways. First, average
rate of migration of the sending country, as a proxy for p0; can be introduced as a
direct determinant of the home country fertility. Second, it is desirable to control for
parents￿human capital, which might be measured by the residents￿education level.
3.3 Fertility and remittances
Migration also impacts on fertility through remittances sent by previous generation
of migrants and /or members of the community. Indeed, We can reasonably consider
that the amount of remittances positively depends on the stock of contemporaneous
compatriots living abroad. In the third variant, we assume that parents have no
possibility to invest in human capital (Et = 0 and Ht is predetermined) and that
children face an exogenous probability to emigrate. However, we now introduce non
labor income, which can be here interpreted as the amount of remittances. The
following speci￿cations are used:
￿ Parents￿probability to emigrate in (6) has a linear form: ￿(:) = 1.
￿ Parents￿productivity in (2) is predetermined: ￿(:) = ht.
￿ Children￿ s human capital in (3) is endogenous: ￿(:) = e
￿
t.
￿ Remittances are positive and exogenous: rt > 0.
The optimization problem of remaining adults can thus be written as the following
fnt;etg = argmaxflog([(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet + rt] + ￿ log[nte
￿
t (1 + !p0)]g
As shown in Appendix 7.3, the optimal fertility rate and investment in children￿ s

















The optimal fertility rates increases with the amount of remittances (linked to the
number of migrants abroad).
10The latter result is closely linked to the choice of the utility function and the
timing of remittances. Assume that the second component of the utility function
(1) is not due to parental altruism but to the fact that parents care about old-age
security. Assuming that working-aged children transfer a fraction ￿ of their income
to their parents and parents also receive other transfers when old, the utility function
would become:




t+1 includes remittances sent by extra-family members to old parents.
Adults￿optimization problem can thus be written as the following
fnt;etg = argmax
￿



























Under the old-age security hypothesis, the optimal fertility rates decreases with
the expected amount of remittances received when old. In sum, the e⁄ect of extra-
family remittances is thus ambiguous. It can be positive of the income e⁄ect dominates
or negative if the old-age security e⁄ect dominates.
3.4 Transfers of norms
As argued in Fargues (2007), one could also argue that migrants transfer fertility
norms to those left behind. To model this hypothesis, let us consider the altruistic
variant of our model and introduce alternative preferences regarding fertility. The
novelty is that, in deciding on the number of children, parents internalize the gain of
utility from conformity to the norm for fertility. Katav-Herz (2003) applied this idea
to the choice of fertility, child education and child labor.
It is well documented that migrants abroad progressively assimilate in terms of
fertility choices. In particular, the average fertility rate of ￿rst-generation immigrants
from developing countries is lower than the fertility rate at origin, although higher
than the average fertility rate of natives at destination. Just as migrants facilitate
transfers of knowledge and ideas, they are also likely to transfer fertility norms to
those left behind. We formalize this idea by introducing a reference level e nt of fertility
(or norm) in the utility function and assume that adults derive utility from nt ￿ e nt
(instead of obtaining utility from nt, adults derive utility from having generally more
children than the reference number of children).
In this variant, we consider that parents cannot invest in education (Ht = ht is
predetermined) and the probability of migration is exogenous (for parent and chil-
dren). The following speci￿cations are used:
11￿ Parents￿probability to emigrate in (6) has a linear form: ￿(:) = 1.
￿ Parents￿productivity in (2) is predetermined: ￿(:) = ht.
￿ Children￿ s human capital in (3) is endogenous: ￿(:) = e
￿
t.
￿ Remittances are nil: rt = 0.
Introducing the norm in the utility function (1), the optimization problem of
non-migrant adults becomes
fnt;etg = argmaxflog([(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet] + ￿ log[(nt ￿ e nt)e
￿
t (1 + !p0)]g
As shown in Appendix 7.4, the optimal fertility rate and investment in children￿ s




￿e nt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) +
q
[￿e nt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]




￿￿Ht(nt ￿ e nt)
n(1 ￿ ￿) + e n￿
(17)
When e n = 0, we have n￿
t =
￿(1￿￿)
￿(1+￿) as in the usual model. When e n is positive, it is
obvious that the optimal fertility is an increasing function of e n (and is independent on
parental income). Hence, if a transfer of norms reduces the reference level of fertility
in the origin society, it impacts negatively on the optimal fertility rate.
The di⁄usion technology can be a complex function of the geographical distribu-
tion of the population and of fertility rate di⁄erentials across countries. We disregard
here the link between the fertility norm and the lagged fertility rate of the domes-
tic country to concentrate on the part of the norm a⁄ected by emigration. If ￿d;t
is the proportion of the emigrant population living in country d, we can de￿ne by
nd =
P
d ￿dnd the average fertility rate at destination (d = 1;:::;D are foreign destina-
tions). Since p0 denotes the average emigration rate, a reasonable di⁄usion technology
can be written as




1 ￿ 0 and N
0
2 ￿ 0.
For example, if N(:) =
￿






or nil, it means that the di⁄usion of norms is relatively independent of the intensity
of migration, and emigrants-based norms can be seen. If ￿
0
is high, the di⁄usion of
norms depends on the intensity of migration.
124 Empirical analysis
The model presented in section 3 enables us to identify the various channels through
which migration can a⁄ect fertility in source countries. It also emphasizes the role of
education for explaining the prevailing fertility behavior. The identi￿ed channels are
embedded in the regression model speci￿ed below.
4.1 Econometric speci￿cation
Our dependent variable is the log of the fertility rate in source countries, log(nt).
The main explanatory variables of interest are the following.
￿ The "norms-di⁄usion" model predicts that the fertility rate should be increasing
in the average fertility rate at destination. We assume a linear form for ￿(p0);i.e.
￿(p0) = a1+a2:p0. From (18), the log of the norm has two additively separable
terms and can be written as log(e n) = a1 log(nd) + a2p0 log(nd). We expect
a non-negative sign for the estimates of a1 and a2 in the empirical equation
(19) below. A similar technology is used by Spilimbergo (2008) who empirically
showed that foreign-educated individuals promote democracy in their home
country, but only if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries.
He constructs an index of average democracy in host countries, which is de￿ned
as the weighted average of democracy indices in host countries where a country￿ s
weight is the share of students going to that country over all foreign students
from the origin country. Here, we transpose the same conceptual di⁄usion model
to fertility behavior.
￿ By altruism, the fertility rate should be decreasing with a country￿ s average
emigration rate and with quality-selective immigration policies at destination.
This suggests the use of two relevant explanatory variables. The ￿rst one is the
average emigration rate (p0). It is measured by the total emigration rate. The
second one aims at measuring selection in migration ￿ ows and is proxied by the
ratio of migrants to residents for skilled relative to unskilled labor (S). These
variables are taken in logs and we expect a negative sign for the estimates of a3
and a4 in the empirical equation (19) below.
￿ Fertility is ambiguously a⁄ected by the amount of remittances sent by extra-
family compatriots abroad. The income e⁄ect predicts that the fertility rate
should be increasing in remittances received when adult. However, the old-
age security model predicts that fertility should be decreasing in remittances
received before retirement since part can be saved for retirement. The expected
sign for a5 is therefore ambiguous. Controlling for remittances R in empirical
regressions will reveal the sign of the global impact of this variable.
13￿ Theory predicts that migration prospects can stimulate the education of adults.
Since educated parents have a higher opportunity cost of time, one expects the
fertility rate to decrease in adults￿human capital. In our regression, we will
use the proportion of adults aged 25+ with secondary and/or post-secondary
education (denoted by H) and expect a negative sign for the estimate of a6.
￿ Finally, we also control for a set of K explanatory variables Xk (k = 1;:::;K)
which are not necessarily linked to international migration but potentially have
an impact on fertility decision. We include the log of GDP per capita, the
urbanization rate, regional dummies as well variables capturing the type and
intensity of religious practice in source countries.
The benchmark empirical model can thus be written as:
log(n) = a0 + a1:ln(n
d) + a2:p0 ln(n
d) + a3:ln(p0)
+a4:ln(S) + a5:ln(R) + a6:H +
X
k
bk:Xk + " (19)
where a0 is a constant and "t is a iid error term.
Our main coe¢ cient of interest are a1 which determines the signi￿cance and mag-
nitude of the di⁄usion of fertility norms. The expected theoretical sign of a1 is
positive. We also interact the (log of) fertility rate at destination with the size of
the diaspora to assess the robustness of the impact to the intensity of migration. In
this set up, the emigration rate is also associated to the incentive channel (a4). We
assume that the incentive e⁄ect follows a concave pattern and is measured by ln(p0):
The expected theoretical sign of a4 is negative, as higher migration prospects increase
the incentive to invest in education and reduce fertility at home.
4.2 Data
Our regression involve cross section data because the migration stocks used to build
fertility at destination nd are only available for 2000: Data on fertility rates (nt)
are taken from the World Development Indicators. The fertility rate is the average
number of children that women have during their lives, from age 15 to age 50. To
compute data on average emigration rates (p0) and geographic shares of the emi-
grant population by destination (￿d;t), we use the data set developed by Parsons,
Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2007). They provide four versions of an interna-
tional bilateral migration stock database for 208 countries and territories of origin
and destination for the year 2000. We use the fourth comprehensive version which
uses a variety of techniques to estimate the missing data. The ￿nal matrix, compris-
ing only the foreign-born reconcile all of the available information in order to provide
the researcher with a single and complete matrix of international bilateral migrant
stocks.
14One striking picture coming out of the data is the importance of South-South
migration (to non OECD countries). Not surprisingly, North-South migration is neg-
ligible as all OECD countries send most of their migrants to other OECD countries.
To illustrate the importance South-South migration, it turns out that 47 percent
of developing countries have their main destination in a non-OECD countries. Out
of those countries, 81 percent send their migrants mostly to a neighboring country.
This is line with the well known stylized fact of prevailing liquidity constraints in
international migration (Lopez and Schi⁄, 1998; Mayda, 2006).
The intensity of South-South migration is important for our analysis for two rea-
sons. First, it suggests that migrants are by no means concentrated in OECD coun-
tries. Therefore, the fertility norms that they will transmit from abroad are much
more heterogeneous that one would expect if most migrants were located in OECD
countries. Second, it suggests that the impact of fertility norms might work in both
directions. In fact, 83 countries have an average fertility at destination that is higher
than the one prevailing at home (i.e. 40 percent of the full sample of 208 countries).
If we consider only developing countries, this situation if observed in 44 cases (i.e. 28
percent of the sample of 155 developing countries)
Combining the fertility data with the bilateral migration matrix allows us to com-
pute weighted average fertility rate at destination, as in equation(18). As expected
from the observed patterns of migration and the importance of South-South migra-
tion as well as the range of fertility rates, the average fertility rates at destination nd
exhibit a high degree of variability, ranging from 1.40 to 5.58.
Table 1 describes the distribution of the fertility rates by country groups. The
countries are classi￿ed along di⁄erent criteria : income (high income vs developing
countries), data availability regarding important variables such as the remittances,
geographical location and religion. In 2000, the fertility rates vary signi￿cantly across
location of the country, from 4.8 children per woman in Africa to 1.4 in Europe. At
the world level, the fertility rate is equal to 3.2 children per woman on average and
ranges from 0.9 in Macau to 7.95 in Niger. Table 1 also provides fertility rates at
destination, i.e. values for nd: The fertility rates at destination are signi￿cantly higher
for Sub Saharan countries and to a lesser extent Islamic countries. This might be
explained by their emigration patterns. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a large share of the
migration ￿ ows is towards neighboring countries that also display high fertility levels.
In Islamic countries such as Egypt of Pakistan, a lot of workers migrate to Gulf
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Data on human capital (Ht) on positive selection in emigration (St), proxied by
the skilled-to-unskilled ratio of emigration rates to rich countries, are computed by
Docquier et al. (2007). Emigration rates (p0) are also computed from the Parsons et
al. (2007) database. Data on remittances are taken from the IMF database. In our
set of controls, we include the urbanization rate (available in the World Development
Indicators)7, regional and religious dummies. Regional dummies are consistent with
the World Bank de￿nition. Given the low number of countries (8) in South Asia,
we join those countries with the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region. Religion
variables are measured in two ways. We ￿rst capture those by the proportion of
Catholics and Muslims in the country. Alternatively, we introduce a dummy for
countries belonging to the organization of the Islamic Conference.
4.3 Results
Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the results for the benchmark regressions. These are obtained
using OLS (in Table 2) and IV (in Table 3) estimations accounting for potential
endogeneity problems. Each table reports the estimation results from a set of variants
in terms of speci￿cations and the used variables.
OLS regressions. Let us start with OLS regressions in Table 2 using the
benchmark speci￿cation (19). In this set up, the norm is supposed to be given
by ln(e nt) = ln(nd) + p0 ln(nd). Following Spilimbergo (2008), the interaction term
p0 ln(nd) tests whether the impact of fertility at destination (the fertility norm) de-
pends on the intensity of migration or not.
The data constraints tend to in￿ uence signi￿cantly the sample size. If we use
the full set of explanatory variables, data unavailability for a couple variables such
as remittances, GDP per head, share of Catholics in the countries and the selection
ratio reduces the sample size. The most important reduction comes from the use
of remittances, which are unavailable for 53 countries. Therefore, we estimate the
model with and without remittances as an explanatory variable. The estimation
results without (resp. with) are presented in columns (1) and (2) (resp. columns (3)
and (4)). The use of the other variables leads to a further reduction of the usable
sample, with 175 countries in the largest sample and 145 countries when remittances
are included. In all Tables, we estimate for each sample a full speci￿cation (columns
1 and 3) as well as a parsimonious one (columns 1 and 4) to increase e¢ ciency in the
estimation.
7Sato (2007) and Sato and Yamamoto (2005) discuss the e⁄ect of agglomeration and urbanization
on fertility rates.
17Table 2. OLS regressions (dep = log of fertility rate) - All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.200 1.037 1.459 1.432
(5.51)*** (6.23)*** (5.11)*** (5.92)***
Log of fertility at dest 0.343 0.383 0.273 0.291
(3.35)*** (4.37)*** (2.40)** (2.76)***
p0:Log of fertility at dest -0.202 -0.405
(0.77) (1.54)
log of p0 -0.025 -0.040 -0.018 -0.053
(0.78) (1.90)* (0.59) (2.44)**
Selection ratio (sec+tert) 0.001 0.001
(0.04) (0.02)
Log of remittances 0.018 0.032
(1.16) (2.18)**
Urbanization -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(2.62)*** (2.88)*** (2.54)** (2.24)**
GDP per capita -0.076 -0.079 -0.100 -0.117
(2.46)** (3.32)*** (2.80)*** (3.86)***
Adult￿ s education -0.256 -0.190
(1.70)* (1.09)
East Asia & Paci￿c 0.272 0.277 0.308 0.272
(2.85)*** (2.99)*** (3.29)*** (2.90)***
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.427 0.420 0.537 0.521
(4.67)*** (4.72)*** (4.75)*** (5.40)***
Latin Am. & Carib 0.350 0.323 0.451 0.486
(5.13)*** (5.31)*** (6.49)*** (8.03)***
Mena 0.115 0.159
(1.21) (1.26)
High-income 0.089 0.229 0.239
(0.96) (2.22)** (2.70)***
Muslims (% of pop) 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(4.40)*** (5.59)*** (2.96)*** (4.55)***
Catholic (% of pop) 0.001 0.002 0.001
(1.81)* (2.68)*** (1.43)
Observations 175 175 145 145
R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.81
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
18Table 2 reports the estimates of model (19) for the sample of all countries. Let
us ￿rst focus on parameters of interest. First, all estimations point to a positive
and signi￿cant impact of fertility norms. For the two samples (with and without
remittances), we ￿nd a signi￿cant a1 coe¢ cient. The elasticity ranges between 0.27
and 0.34. In contrast, in all regressions, the interaction term p0 ln(nd) turns out to be
insigni￿cant, suggesting that the transfer of norm does not depend on the intensity
of migration. In subsequent regressions, this interaction term is dropped in order to
increase e¢ ciency in the parameter. Our estimates therefore suggest that on average,
a decrease of 1% of the fertility at destination leads to a decrease of about 0.30% in
the home country fertility.
The estimation results also point to a (weakly) signi￿cant incentive impact, as
re￿ ected by the negative and signi￿cant parameter a3; as re￿ ected by the results of
the parsimonious regressions (columns 2 and 4). The results support the idea that
higher migration prospects tend to slightly reduce fertility at home, possibly through
a higher investment in education. The coe¢ cient associated to the selection ratio (a4)
is however non signi￿cant and is also dropped in the subsequent parsimonious regres-
sions. The negative estimate of the adults￿education level (a6) is in line with the
incentive impact of migration through investment in education. The weakly signi￿-
cant coe¢ cient might be explained by the high collinearity with the level of GDP per
head, especially given the cross sectional dimension data. 8 It is therefore dropped in
parsimonious speci￿cations. As for the impact of remittances (a5), we ￿nd moderate
support for a positive impact on fertility at home in the parsimonious speci￿cation.
This could suggest that the income e⁄ect slightly dominates the negative impact
associated to the old-age security. Nevertheless, one might expect that old-age secu-
rity e⁄ect of the migrant￿ s transfers play a higher role in developing countries than
in developed countries. We check this point below when restricting the sample to
developing countries only.
As for the control variables included in regression (19), our results are mostly
in line with the expected impact. Fertility rates are found to decrease with income
per capita. They are found to be higher in Islamic countries and increase with the
proportion of Catholics in the country. Compared to the ECA-SA region, fertility
rates are higher Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and East Asia and Paci￿c.
IV regressions. The OLS estimation of model (19) rests on the assumption
that all covariates are independent of "t. Nevertheless, it might be argued that some
variables might depend on fertility, invalidating this assumption. In particular, higher
fertility rates should increase labor supply and depress wages in domestic countries,
a⁄ecting international migration. In other words, ln(p0) that captures the incentive
channel might depend on the level of the home country fertility rate ln(nt): In this
case, reverse causality might a⁄ect directly the quality of the estimation of a3 but also
8The correlation between the adults￿human capital and incoime per head amounts to 0.67 (resp.
0.57) for the full sample (resp. sample of developing countries).
19the ones of other coe¢ cients such as a1
9. If such an e⁄ect is quantitatively important,
it might be desirable to carry out instrumental variable estimation. Note that since
we are using migration shares across destination countries (￿d) rather than stocks of
migrants to build the norm variable; we can rule out any reverse causality running






Table 3 reports the IV estimates of model (19) for the whole sample of countries.
We consider the following instruments of the (log of) emigration rate: a dummy vari-
able for islands, the (log of the) size of the country measured by its surface (in squared
kilometers) and (the log of the) distance to main destination of the migrants.10 It
is worth emphasizing that the two necessary conditions for instrumentation are ful-
￿lled in our regressions. First, the ￿rst stage estimation results indicate that we have
strong instruments. The F statistics of the ￿rst stage regressions are most of the
time above 10. The partial correlations of the ￿rst stage regression show that the 3
instruments explain a signi￿cant part of the variability of emigration rates. Second,
as suggested by the p-value of the Hansen overidenti￿cation test, those instruments
are found to be independent of the fertility rates. The test fails to reject the null
hypothesis of independence between the instrument set and the error term.
The main ￿ndings of the IV estimations are broadly similar to those of the OLS
estimations. We ￿nd evidence of a shifting norm e⁄ect (a1) and reject the existence of
an interaction e⁄ect with the emigration intensity (a2). The elasticity of the transfer
of norm also remains quite in line with the one estimated by the OLS regressions. It
is however slightly lower for the sample of countries for which data of remittances are
available. We ￿nd moderate evidence of an incentive e⁄ect of migration on fertility,
as suggested by the estimate of a3 in the parsimonious speci￿cation including the
remittances. In this set up, the slightly positive impact of remittances on fertility
rates is also con￿rmed. On the whole, the impact of the other variables are in general
in line with the one found in OLS regressions.
9Theoretically speaking, the existence of a reverse causality between migration and fertility im-
plies that the interaction term (emigration rate times the fertility norm) should also be instrumented.
Nevertheless, since this term is insigni￿cant in OLS regressions, we focus on the instrumentation of
the emigration rate only.
10The ￿rst stage regressions of the IV estimations yield estimates that are in line with intuition.
In particular, size is negatively associated to emigration rates. Islands are found to display higher
migration rates and higher distance to main destination negatively a⁄ects emigration rates. The
estimation results are not reported here to save space but can be obtained upon request to the ￿rst
author.
20Table 3. IV regressions (dep = log of fertility rate) - All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.253 1.116 1.482 1.101
(5.99)*** (5.90)*** (6.30)*** (5.86)***
Log of fertility at dest 0.385 0.390 0.236 0.273
(3.44)*** (4.18)*** (1.91)* (2.57)**
p0:Log of fertility at dest -0.223 -0.090
(0.41) (0.23)
log of p0 -0.020 -0.019 -0.060 -0.075
(0.28) (0.52) (1.12) (2.45)**
Selection ratio (sec+tert) -0.005 -0.017
(0.18) (0.58)
Log of remittances 0.019 0.032
(1.29) (2.17)**
Urbanization -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(2.79)*** (2.69)*** (2.97)*** (2.88)***
GDP per capita -0.075 -0.072 -0.107 -0.063
(2.17)** (2.81)*** (3.18)*** (2.74)***
Adult￿ s education -0.282 -0.204
(1.87)* (1.24)
East Asia & Paci￿c 0.238 0.245 0.268 0.220
(2.51)** (2.63)*** (2.70)*** (2.38)**
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.372 0.434 0.499 0.495
(4.35)*** (5.15)*** (4.69)*** (5.22)***
Latin Am. & Carib 0.321 0.371 0.435 0.412
(4.57)*** (6.27)*** (5.92)*** (7.18)***
Mena 0.076 0.238
(0.73) (2.39)**
High-income 0.169 0.191 0.205 0.134
(1.81)* (2.26)** (1.98)** (1.62)
Muslims (% of pop) 0.235 0.220 0.227 0.210
(4.17)*** (4.02)*** (3.88)*** (3.68)***
Catholic (% of pop) 0.001 0.001
(1.17) (1.21)
Partial Corr First Stage 0.174 0.342 0.212 0.400
F-stat First Stage 12.39 20.27 11.26 36.36
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.130 0.319 0.63 0.67
R-squared 0.774 0.757 0.824 0.803
Observations 174 175 144 144
Robust t statistics in parentheses
Instruments for ln(p0): island, ln(size), ln(distance to main destination)
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
21Focusing on developing countries. The results of the benchmark regressions
tend to support the existence of a transfer of norms between countries in terms
of fertility. In this section, we assess the sensitivity of the choice of the included
countries in the sample. Here, we restrict our attention to the determinants of fertility
rates in the developing countries only. This robustness check stems at least for two
reasons. First, although we have no direct evidence for that, it might be expected
that norms might in the ￿rst instance be from developed to developing countries.
Second, other channels through which migration a⁄ect fertility might di⁄er between
developed and developing countries. One obvious example concerns the impact of
remittances. One might expect that the e⁄ect of transfers associated to old-age
security concerns is stronger in developing countries in which legal pension systems
are much less developed. In this case, we should expect the impact of remittances on
fertility rates to be less positive or even to be negative as the income e⁄ect will be
more o⁄set by the old-age security e⁄ect.
Table 4 and Table 5 report the results with the sample of developing countries
only. A country is considered developed if it is classi￿ed as a high income country
in the World Bank classi￿cation. The results might summarized as follows. We ￿nd
con￿rmation of strongly signi￿cant e⁄ect of a transfer of norms in all regressions.
Nevertheless, we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erence in the elasticity between the
full sample and the one including the developing countries only. We also ￿nd con￿r-
mation that this impact does not depend directly on the intensity of migration, as the
in￿ uence of the interaction term p0 ln(nd) is always strongly rejected in all regressions.
We ￿nd moderate evidence of an incentive e⁄ect of migration through investment in
education (see Table 5 and in particular IV estimate of a3 in a parsimonious speci￿-
cation with the remittances included as a control variable). Interestingly, we ￿nd less
positive impact of remittances on the fertility rates for developing countries, although
our regressions clearly rejects the hypothesis that old-age security e⁄ect dominates
the income one.
22Table 4. OLS regressions (dep = log of fertility rate)
Developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.270 1.267 1.587 1.525
(5.40)*** (6.20)*** (5.17)*** (6.29)***
Log of fertility at dest 0.337 0.338 0.267 0.261
(3.28)*** (3.65)*** (2.26)** (2.34)**
p0:Log of fertility at dest -0.181 -0.368
(0.60) (1.21)
log of p0 -0.019 -0.028 -0.009 -0.034
(0.54) (1.17) (0.28) (1.49)
Selection ratio (sec+tert) -0.001 -0.013
(0.02) (0.41)
Log of remittances 0.008 0.016
(0.52) (1.14)
Urbanization -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(1.97)* (1.84)* (2.87)*** (2.38)**
GDP per capita -0.088 -0.094 -0.112 -0.116
(2.67)*** (3.25)*** (2.85)*** (3.81)***
Adult￿ s education -0.375 -0.422 -0.350 -0.383
(2.30)** (2.67)*** (1.91)* (2.15)**
East Asia & Paci￿c 0.406 0.387 0.407 0.363
(3.50)*** (3.40)*** (3.98)*** (3.66)***
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.428 0.387 0.519 0.439
(4.55)*** (4.34)*** (4.52)*** (4.40)***
Latin Am. & Carib 0.335 0.298 0.414 0.344
(4.81)*** (4.38)*** (6.15)*** (5.23)***
Mena 0.115 0.192
(1.11) (1.40)
Muslims (% of pop) 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
(4.51)*** (5.44)*** (3.11)*** (4.93)***
Catholic (% of pop) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(2.62)*** (2.86)*** (3.03)*** (3.30)***
Observations 143 143 119 119
R-squared 0.77 0.76 0.84 0.83
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
23Table 5. IV regressions (dep = log of fertility rate)
Developing countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.319 1.388 1.529 1.422
(5.35)*** (6.02)*** (5.62)*** (6.42)***
Log of fertility at dest 0.375 0.360 0.219 0.229
(3.45)*** (3.70)*** (1.91)* (2.12)**
p0:Log of fertility at dest -0.695 0.041
(1.14) (0.10)
log of p0 0.048 0.005 -0.070 -0.069
(0.62) (0.12) (1.24) (2.22)**
Selection ratio (sec+tert) 0.016 -0.024
(0.44) (0.71)
Log of remittances 0.015 0.024
(1.07) (1.67)*
Urbanization -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(2.06)** (1.41) (2.95)*** (2.62)***
GDP per capita -0.070 -0.099 -0.118 -0.107
(1.81)* (3.29)*** (3.28)*** (3.69)***
Adult￿ s education -0.413 -0.482 -0.318 -0.321
(2.55)** (3.01)*** (1.83)* (1.82)*
East Asia & Paci￿c 0.425 0.396 0.364 0.334
(3.93)*** (3.72)*** (3.33)*** (3.26)***
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.445 0.378 0.502 0.451
(4.43)*** (4.08)*** (4.99)*** (4.97)***
Latin Am. & Carib 0.353 0.276 0.390 0.361
(4.78)*** (3.96)*** (5.62)*** (5.62)***
Mena 0.098 0.179
(0.88) (1.47)
Muslims (% of pop) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(4.31)*** (5.20)*** (3.51)*** (5.61)***
Catholic (% of pop) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(2.22)** (2.87)*** (3.38)*** (3.35)***
Partial Corr First Stage 0.150 0.336 0.183 0.367
F-stat First Stage 9.46 19.00 8.03 25.40
Hansen J Test (p-value) 0.298 0.420 0.803 0.623
R-squared 0.755 0.758 0.829 0.824
Observations 142 142 118 118
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
Instruments for ln(p0): island, ln(size), ln(distance to main destination)
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
24Dynamics. We supplement our cross sectional evidence by running a dynamic
model of fertility. The unavailability of migration data for periods prior to 2000
prevents us to estimate a panel regression model. Nevertheless, it might be interesting
to estimate a model linking the change in fertility rates with the distance between the
prevailing fertility rate and the fertility rate at destination. Introducing inertia in a
dynamic model makes the implications of our results stronger, for instance in terms
of convergence. Since the fertility norm validated by our cross sectional analysis is
log(nd), we run the following regression:






+a3:ln(St) + a4:ln(Rt) + "
The key coe¢ cient is a1: Our model of transfer of norms implies a1 < 0 : countries
with fertility rates higher (resp. lower) than their fertility at destination are expected
to see a decrease (resp. increase) in their fertility rate. We use the change in fertility
rates between 2000 and 2005 as the dependent variable. The model is estimated
with OLS and involves di⁄erent samples. Table 6 summarizes the main ￿ndings.
The coe¢ cient a1 is negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level in the four samples and
speci￿cations. This con￿rms the existence of a ￿-convergence process. The average
value of a1 across the four regressions is about -1/8. Focusing on the terms in nt and
nt
d, equation (20) can be rewritten as:









Equation (21) indicates that an equal proportionate increase in the 2000 fertility
rate and the 2000 fertility norm raises the 2005 fertility rate by the same proportionate
amount, with 7/8 of that increase due to the increase in the 2000 fertility rate and 1/8
due to the increase in the fertility norm. The migration rate has a positive impact on
the 2000-to-2005 change in fertility rate in three of the four fertility change regressions
(signi￿cant at the 1% level in two of the four regressions and at the 10% level in a third
one), which seems to make more sense than the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cients
obtained in four of the sixteen level regressions.
25Table 6: Dynamic speci￿cation (dep = ln(nt+1) ￿ ln(nt))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.014 0.008 -0.050 -0.028
(0.57) (0.37) (1.79)* (1.11)
ln(nt) ￿ ln(nt
d) -0.121 -0.122 -0.115 -0.131
(4.73)*** (5.43)*** (4.28)*** (5.34)***
ln(p0;t) 0.019 0.015 0.029 0.021
(1.67)* (1.54) (4.16)*** (3.05)***
ln(St) -0.002 -0.014 0.009 -0.002
(0.19) (1.44) (1.53) (0.41)
ln(Rt) -0.009 -0.008
(2.04)** (1.89)*
Observations 153 192 119 146
R-squared 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.33
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Policy implications. The ￿ndings presented here have policy implications for
both source countries in the South and host countries in the North.
Developing countries experiencing rapid population growth have typically looked
at migration as one of the means of reducing population pressure and thus of reducing
any social, economic and political problems associated with it. This paper has shown
that South-North migration can also lead to a reduction in fertility rates, and thus
to a more permanent reduction in population pressure in the South, by serving as a
channel for the transfer of low-fertility norms and by raising the incentive to acquire
education.
We can infer from this that an inter-temporal substitution (or tradeo⁄) between
present and future migration exists, with an increase in current immigration resulting
in a decrease in future population pressure in the South and thus in a decrease in
future immigration pressure in the North. Developed host countries would bene￿t by
taking the inter-temporal substitution in migration into account in the design of their
immigration policy. Doing so should result in a more relaxed immigration policy.
Second, developing emigration countries could achieve a greater reduction in pop-
ulation pressure by ￿nding ways of directing emigrants towards the OECD countries
with the lowest fertility rates. This endeavor should be made easier by the fact that
such countries would be likely to be more open to immigration than countries with
higher fertility rates.
265 Conclusion
Though numerous studies have examined the impact of migration on the fertility
of migrants and their household, this paper is the ￿rst one to provide a systematic
analysis of the impact of migration on fertility in migrants￿home countries. Its main
objective was to identify migration￿ s impact on the transfer of destination countries￿
norms to migrants￿home countries and hence its impact on home countries￿fertility
rates.
The paper ￿rst provided a theoretical analysis of the various channels through
which international migration might impact fertility in migrants￿home country. The
model shows that migration raises adults￿incentive to invest in their and their chil-
dren￿ s education and thus reduces fertility, that it raises remittance levels and that
these have an ambiguous impact on fertility, and that the transfer of norms from low-
(high-) fertility destination countries reduces (raises) fertility in migrants￿countries
of origin.
The model￿ s predictions are supported by the empirical results. Regarding the
transfer of norms, we found that a one percent increase in the fertility norm to
which migrants are exposed reduces home country fertility by about 0.3 percent for
developing countries as well as for all countries. Thus, migration from high-fertility
home countries to low-fertility destination countries reduces fertility in the former
ones.
The ￿ndings presented here have a number of policy implications. Developing
countries￿authorities that have experienced rapid population growth continue to be
greatly concerned with the potential social, economic and political problems associ-
ated with it. These countries have typically looked at migration as one of the (static)
ways of reducing population pressure. This paper has shown that South-North mi-
gration can lead to a reduction in fertility rates and thus contribute to a reduction
in home country population pressure by serving as a channel for the transfer of low-
fertility norms and by raising the incentive to acquire education.
The tradeo⁄ implicit in the impact of migration on fertility should be taken into
account by developed host countries since accepting more migrants in the short run
may reduce the migration pressure in the long run. Moreover, emigration countries
could achieve a greater reduction in population pressure by ￿nding ways of directing
emigrants towards the OECD countries with the lowest fertility rates. These countries
are also likely to be more open to migration than those with higher fertility.
Finally, we should note that further research of various aspects of this issue is
on our research agenda ￿including possible di⁄erences in the home country fertility
impact of a transfer of host country norms by men and by women, and di⁄erences in
that impact for fertility norms that are higher or lower than the home country fertility
￿, and we hope that this paper will trigger other people￿ s interest in contributing to
the research e⁄ort in this area.
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317 Appendix
7.1 Analytics of section 3.1
We solve the model in two steps and proceed backwards. First, for a given location,
parents choose their optimal number of children. Second, after substituting this
number in the utility function, parents decide how much to invest in education taking
into account the endogenous probability of emigrating.












+ ￿ log[nt] + C:
where the constant term C stands for the given levels of human capital and expected
wage of their children.







and is clearly decreasing with the time spent by adults in higher education (before
having children). Substituting the optimal fertility rate in the utility function gives
the quasi-indirect utility function which depends on parents￿education choice:
V
f
t (Et) = (1 + ￿)log(1 ￿ Et) + ￿ log(Et) + log(w
f) + ￿





￿ log(1 + ￿) + log(A) + (1 ￿ ￿)log(h) + C is a constant.
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t (Et) = (1 + ￿)log(1 ￿ Et) + ￿ log(Et) + ￿
Agents then maximize the expected utility function, (1￿pt)V h
t +ptV
f
t . The choice
of higher education solves the following optimization problem
fEtg = argmax(1 + ￿)log(1 ￿ Et) + ￿
h
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327.2 Analytics of section 3.2
The optimization problem for remaining adults can thus be written as following:
fnt;etg = argmaxflog[(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet] + ￿ log[nte
￿
t (1 + !p0e
￿
t)]g
The ￿rst order conditions (with respect to nt and et) can be expressed as
￿Ht + et
















The ￿rst condition is standard and implies that the total cost of children (raising
cost + education) is proportional to the parent￿ s maximal wage at the equilibrium









(1 + ￿)(￿Ht + et)
;
i.e. fertility decreases with children￿ s education for a given parental income.




t + (1 ￿ ￿)et ￿ 2￿￿Ht!p0e
￿
t ￿ ￿￿Ht = 0
Assuming ￿ = 1
2, the implicit function above becomes quadratic in et and gives









7.3 Analytics of section 3.3
In the ￿rst sub-case, we assume that remittances rt are received by young parents.
The optimization problem of remaining adults can thus be written as the following
fnt;etg = argmaxflog([(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet + rt] + ￿ log[nte
￿
t (1 + !p0)]g
The ￿rst order conditions (with respect to nt and et) can be expressed as
￿Ht + et









33As usual, the optimal cost of children is proportional to the parent￿ s maximal
income






















In the second sub-case, we assume that working-aged children transfer a fraction
￿ of their income to their parents. Parents also receive other remittances ro
t+1 from
extra-family members when old, the utility function would become:
Ut = log(ct) + ￿ log(￿ e wt+1ht+1nt + r
o
t+1)
Adults￿optimization problem can thus be written as the following
fnt;etg = argmax
￿








The ￿rst order conditions (with respect to nt and et) can be expressed as
￿Ht + et
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7.4 Analytics of section 3.4
The optimization problem of non-migrant adults becomes
fnt;etg = argmaxflog([(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet] + ￿ log[(nt ￿ e nt)e
￿
t (1 + !p0)]g
34The ￿rst order conditions (with respect to nt and et) become
￿Ht + et
(1 ￿ ￿nt)Ht ￿ ntet
=
￿
nt ￿ e nt
nt




From the second condition, we can easily derive the optimal investment in children
education as a function of the fertility rate
et =
￿￿Ht(nt ￿ e nt)
n(1 ￿ ￿) + e n￿
Substituting this equation in the ￿rst conditions gives, after straightforward ma-
nipulations, a quadratic implicit function in nt:
￿(1 + ￿)n
2
t ￿ [￿e nt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]nt ￿ ￿￿e nt = 0




￿e nt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) +
q
[￿e nt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
2 + 4￿￿￿(1 + ￿)
2￿(1 + ￿)
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